Cooperative Behavior and Common Pool Resources

This paper examines whether cooperative
behavior by respondents measured as contributions in a
one-shot public goods game correlates with reported
pro-forest collective action behaviors. All the outcomes
analyzed are costly in terms of time, land, or money. The
study finds significant evidence that more cooperative
individuals (or those who believe their group members will
cooperate) engage in collective action behaviors that
support common forests, once the analysis is adjusted for
demographic factors, wealth, and location. Those who
contribute more in the public goods experiment are found to
be more likely to have planted trees in community forests
during the previous month and to have invested in biogas.
They also have planted more trees on their own farms and
spent more time monitoring community forests. As cooperation
appears to be highly conditional on beliefs about others’
cooperation, these results suggest that policies to support
cooperation and strengthen local governance could be
important for collective action and economic outcomes
associated with forest resources. As forest management and
quality in developing countries is particularly important
for climate change policy, these results suggest that
international efforts such as the United Nations
Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation should pay particular
attention to supporting governance and cooperation at the
local level.