Resource information
This paper reports on a randomized field
experiment that uses price incentives to address economic
and gender inequality in land tenure formalization. During
the 1990s and 2000s, nearly two dozen African countries
proposed de jure land reforms extending access to formal,
freehold land tenure to millions of poor households. Many of
these reforms stalled. Titled land remains the de facto
preserve of wealthy households and, within households, men.
Beginning in 2010, the study tested whether price
instruments alone can generate greater inclusion by offering
formal titles to residents of a low-income, unplanned
settlement in Dar es Salaam at a range of subsidized prices,
as well as additional price incentives to include women as
owners or co-owners of household land. Estimated price
elasticities of demand confirm that prices -- rather than
other implementation failures or features of the titling
regime -- are a key obstacle to broader inclusion in the
land registry, and that some degree of pro-poor price
discrimination is justified even from a narrow budgetary
perspective. In terms of gender inequality, the study finds
that even small price incentives for female co-titling
achieve almost complete gender parity in land ownership with
no reduction in demand.